Abstract:
According to some archives and memoirs publicly announced in America, Russia and EastEuropean countries, there were varieties of reasons for Soviet Union’s redispatching troops to Hungary in 1956. The Hungarian Incident was a grave challenge to Soviet control power on eastern Europe, so the current Soviet leadership feared that it might affect the whole of eastern Europe and even Soviet Union itself and break the Socialist Camp of Soviet Union and eastern Europe. Khrushchev had a series of important reasons for redispatching troops, including Nagi government’s fencesitting attitude and more and more exposure to reactionary effects, Nagy losing his control over the situation that was happening in Budapest and the U.S. Government’s socalled nonintervention policy. But the actually decisive impelling element that caused Soviet to change its decision was the Suez Crisis, which led to a sudden change of the world order. Britain and France launched an aggressive war against Egypt and “made successive progressions”, which froze Soviet Union’s determination to cope with Hungarian Crisis again by force in case Hungary should throw itself into the arms of the NATO or become a “bridge tower” to Soviet Union.