Incompleteness of Supervision, Desalination of Governmental Creditability and Self-discipline Administration
LI Huamin
(Southern China Institution of Banking, Guangdong Banking Institute, Guangzhou 510521, Guangdong; College of Economics and Administration, Southern China Normal University, Guangzhou 510632, Guangdong)
Abstract:
The incompleteness of law and supervision determines the space of existence for self-discipline in Chinese banking, “the temporal binding effect” to become incorporated with the system of WTO and the necessity of desalination of state creditability out of the government bank and leads to the birth of system of self-discipline administration in Chinese banking. The unpredictability generated spontaneously in natural evolution totally through market and the governmental leading part characteristic of the existing self-discipline system have both resulted from the poor cooperation of private sect and shortage of market initiative in punishment. At present, the efficiency of the banking self-discipline system comes at least partly from the mobilization and utilization of resources of the special institutions and the “intruding” drive of governmental supervising departments. With the deeper advancement of reform and opening in Chinese banking, the present government-driven self-discipline system must evolve to a market-punishment-based spontaneous self-discipline system of banking administration.
KeyWords:
state supervision; state creditability; self-discipline system of administration; mechanism of reputation effect; mechanism of market punishment