哲学社会科学版
陕西师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)
社会发展与治理研究
“借力式发展”:资本下乡背景下村企互动的均衡样态及其实现机制
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李元元, 曹聪敏
(西北农林科技大学 人文社会发展学院, 陕西 杨凌 712100)
李元元,男,安徽芜湖人,社会学博士,西北农林科技大学人文社会发展学院教授,博士研究生导师,西北农林科技大学黄河流域乡村振兴研究与评估中心研究员。
摘要:
在资本下乡过程中村企互动均衡样态的分析概念“借力式发展”,是指村企双方通过借力彼此的身份与资源优势,撬动发展所需,在不断交换的基础上实现利益分配结构的均衡,进而建构一种双方互惠格局。案例研究表明,积极有为的村集体中介机制、“结构—行动”借力机制和互动平台的适时转变机制推动了村企之间“借力式发展”的有效运行。“借力式发展”在理论维度上有助于突破以零和博弈为假设的村企互动样态,在实践层面能够为村企在农村社会的均衡互动提供知识基础。
关键词:
乡村振兴; 资本下乡; 村企互动; “借力式发展”; 均衡样态
收稿日期:
2022-11-12
中图分类号:
F320.3; F12
文献标识码:
A
文章编号:
1672-4283(2023)03-0122-12
基金项目:
研究阐释党的十九届六中全会精神国家社会科学基金重大项目“建设共建共治共享的社会治理制度研究”(22ZDA101)
Doi:
10.15983/j.cnki.sxss.2023.0510
“Borrowing Development”: The Equilibrium Pattern of Villageenterprise Interaction and Its Realization Mechanism Under the Background of Capital Going to the Countryside
LI Yuanyuan, CAO Congmin
(College of Humanities and Social Development, Northwest A&F University, Yangling 712100, Shaanxi)
Abstract:
This paper attempts to construct an analytical concept of the balanced interaction between village and enterprise in the process of capital sending to the countryside——“leveraging development”: By taking advantage of each other’s identity and resource advantages, the two sides can leverage the needs of development. On the basis of constant exchange, the two sides can achieve a balance of interest distribution structure, and then construct a mutually beneficial pattern. The case study shows that the active village collective intermediary mechanism, the “structureaction” borrowing mechanism, and the timely transformation mechanism of the interactive platform promote the effective operation of the “borrowing development” between the village and the enterprise. In the theoretical dimension, “leveraging development” can help break through the villageenterprise interaction pattern assumed by zerosum game, and on the practical level, it can provide an intellectual foundation for the balanced interaction between villageenterprise in rural society.
KeyWords:
rural revitalization; capital to the countryside; village enterprise interaction; “borrowing type development”; equilibrium shape